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Abstract
Health care report cards￿public disclosure of patient health outcomes
at the level of the individual physician and/or hospital￿may address im-
portant informational asymmetries in markets for health care, but they
may also give doctors and hospitals incentives to decline to treat more
diﬃcult, severely ill patients. Whether report cards are good for patients
and for society depends on whether their ￿nancial and health bene￿ts out-
weigh their costs in terms of the quantity, quality, and appropriateness of
medical treatment that they induce. Using national data on Medicare
patients at risk for cardiac surgery, we ￿nd that cardiac surgery report
cards in New York and Pennsylvania led both to selection behavior by
providers and to improved matching of patients with hospitals. On net,
this led to higher levels of resource use and to worse health outcomes,
particularly for sicker patients. We conclude that, at least in the short
run, these report cards decreased patient and social welfare.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, policy makers and researchers alike have given consid-
erable attention to quality ￿report cards￿ in sectors such as health care and
education. These report cards provide information about the performance of
hospitals, physicians, and schools where performance depends both on the skill
and eﬀort of the producer and the characteristics of their patients/students.
Perhaps the best known health care report card is New York State￿s publica-
tion of physician and hospital coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery
∗Northwestern University; **Stanford University and NBER; ***Council of Economic Ad-
visers, on leave from Stanford University and NBER. We would like to thank David Becker
for exceptional research assistance, Paul Gertler, Paul Oyer, and Patrick Romano for valuable
comments, and seminar participants at the Boston University/Veterans Administration Bi-
ennial Health Economics Conference, NBER IO Workshop, Northwestern/Toulouse Joint IO
Seminar, Stanford University, UCLA, University of Chicago, University of Illinois, University
of Texas, University of Toronto, and Yale University for helpful suggestions. Funding from
the US National Institutes on Aging and the Agency for Health Care Research and Qual-
ity through the NBER is gratefully appreciated. The views expressed in this paper do not
represent those of the US Government or any other of the authors￿ institutions.
1mortality rates. Other states and private consulting ￿rms also publish hospital
mortality rates. Many private insurers and consortia of large employers use this
information when forming physician and hospital networks and as a means of
quality assurance.
The health policy community disagrees on the merits of report cards. Sup-
porters argue that they enable patients to identify the best physicians and hospi-
tals, while simultaneously giving providers powerful incentives to improve qual-
ity.1 Skeptics counter that there are at least three reasons why report cards
may encourage providers to ￿game￿ the system by avoiding sick and/or seek-
ing healthy patients. First, it is essential for the analysts who create report
cards to adjust health outcomes for diﬀerences in patient characteristics (￿risk
adjustment￿), for otherwise providers who treat the most serious cases necessar-
ily appear to have low quality. But analysts can only adjust for characteristics
that they can observe. Unfortunately, because of the complexity of patient care,
providers are likely to have better information on patients￿ conditions than even
the most clinically detailed data base. For this reason, providers may be able to
improve their ranking by selecting patients on the basis of characteristics that
are unobservable to the analysts but predictive of good outcomes.2
Even if providers do not have superior information on patients￿ condition,
they may still have two other reasons to engage in selection. Suppose that the
diﬀerence in outcomes achieved by low and high quality providers is greater for
sick patients. Considerable circumstantial evidence supports this assumption.
For example, Capps et al. (2001) ￿nd that sick patients are more willing to
incur ￿nancial and travel costs to obtain treatment from high quality providers,
suggesting that sick patients have more to gain from doing so. In this case, low
quality providers have strong incentives to avoid the sick and seek the healthy.
By shifting their practice toward healthier patients, inferior providers make it
diﬃcult for report cards to con￿dently distinguish them from their high-quality
counterparts, because on relatively healthy patients they have almost as good
outcomes. In other words, low-quality providers pool with their high-quality
counterparts.
Lastly, even if risk-adjustment were correct in expectation terms but incom-
plete ￿ that is, risk-adjustment produces noisy estimates of true quality ￿ it
may not compensate risk-averse providers suﬃciently for the downside of treat-
ing sick patients. The cost in utility terms to a risk-averse provider of accepting
a sick patient would be greater than the cost of accepting a healthy patient, as
long as the variance in the unexplained portion of outcomes is greater for the
sick than for the healthy. In practical terms, the utility loss from a few bad
1Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992), which examines price and quality determination in
markets where consumers have noisy information about each, identi￿es suﬃcient conditions
for report cards on quality to lead to long run improvements in welfare. While we do not
study long run changes in this paper, there is anecdotal evidence that providers did take steps
to boost quality after the publication of report cards in New York.
2For example, even if such comorbid diseases as diabetes or heart failure are measured
accurately for purposes of adjusting report cards, physicians who treat patients with more
severe or complex cases of diabetes or heart failure are still likely to have worse measured
performance.
2(risk-adjusted) outcomes that drove a provider to the bottom of the rankings,
generated bad publicity, and catastrophically harmed his or her reputation ex-
ceeds the utility gain from a corresponding random positive shock.3 The fact
that report cards are often based on small samples further aggravates both of
these incentive problems.
In this paper, we develop a comprehensive empirical framework for assessing
the competing claims about report cards. We apply this framework to the
adoption of mandatory CABG surgery report cards in New York (NY) and
Pennsylvania (PA) in the early 1990s. We begin by testing for three potential
eﬀects of report cards on the treatment of cardiac illness:
￿ T h em a t c h i n go fp a t i e n t st op r o v i d e r s . If sick patients have more to
gain by receiving treatment from high quality providers, then report cards
can improve welfare through improved matching of patients to providers.
Sick patients disproportionately have an incentive to seek out the best
providers. In addition, the best providers have less incentive to shun the
sickest patients.
￿ The incidence and quantity of CABG surgeries. Provider selection can
shift the incidence of CABG surgery from sicker to healthier patients. At
the same time, the total number of surgeries may go up or down. As
clinicians have pointed out, incidence eﬀects can be socially harmful if
sicker patients derive the greatest bene￿t from bypass surgery (e.g., Topol
and Caliﬀ1 994, note 21). On the other hand, they may be socially
constructive, if the equilibrium distribution of intensive treatment in the
absence of report cards is too heavily weighted toward sicker patients.
￿ The incidence and quantity of complementary and substitute intensive car-
diac procedures. For example, a report-card induced decrease in CABG
surgeries for sick patients could lead to a shift towards other substitute
revascularization procedures, such as angioplasty (PTCA). However, if
doctors and hospitals institute processes to avoid mortality from inva-
sive cardiac procedures generally, then a report-card induced decrease
in CABG could be accompanied by a decrease in PTCA. In this case,
report-card induced decreases in therapeutic procedures such as CABG
and PTCA would be accompanied by decreases in complementary diag-
nostic procedures such as cardiac catheterization (CATH). This too could
be welfare-improving or reducing, depending on the consequences of the
changing mix of treatment for health care costs and patient health out-
comes.
Then, we measure the net consequences of report cards for health care expen-
ditures and patients￿ health outcomes.
We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DD) approach to estimate the short-run
eﬀects of report cards in the population of all U.S. elderly heart attack (AMI)
3Dziuban et al. (1994) present a case study focusing on physicians￿ concerns about the
incentives for selection generated by prediction errors in the New York CABG report card.
3patients and all elderly patients receiving CABG from 1987 through 1994. We
estimate the eﬀect of report cards to be the diﬀerence in trends after the in-
troduction of report cards in NY and PA relative to the diﬀerence in trends in
control states. We ￿nd that report cards improved matching of patients with
hospitals, increased the quantity of CABG surgery and changed its incidence
from sicker patients towards healthier patients, and reduced the quantity of
PTCA. Overall this led to higher costs and a deterioration of outcomes, espe-
cially among more ill patients. We therefore conclude that the report cards were
welfare-reducing.
This analysis hinges on two key assumptions. First, we assume that the
adoption of report cards is uncorrelated with unobserved state-level trends in
the treatments, costs, and outcomes of cardiac patients. Second, we assume
that AMI patients are a relevant at-risk population for CABG, but that unlike
the population of patients who actually receive CABG, the composition of the
AMI population is not aﬀected by report cards. We explore the validity of these
assumptions below.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the institutional
history behind health care quality report cards and summarizes previous re-
search about their eﬀects. Section 3 presents our empirical models. It describes
in detail how we test for the presence of matching, incidence, and quantity
eﬀects and how we identify the consequences of report cards for treatment de-
cisions, costs, and outcomes. Section 4 discusses our data sources. Section 5
presents our results and section 6 concludes by discussing the generalizability
and implications of our ￿ndings.
2 Background and Previous Research
Brief history. Prior to 1994, the federal government and several states produced
a variety of health care quality report cards.4 Of these, only NY and PA had
mandatory, public report cards that utilized clinical information beyond that
recorded in generic hospital discharge abstracts. Both these states reported out-
comes for patients receiving CABG. (PA later developed a report card on AMI
patients￿ outcomes.) The U.S. Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) in
1986, followed by several other states including California and Wisconsin, imple-
mented discharge-abstract based reporting systems based either on populations
with speci￿c illnesses or on populations receiving one or more procedures, or on
both. Since the national HCFA report card preceded state-level report cards and
since discharge-abstract based report cards are more likely to suﬀer from noise
and bias problems (e.g., Romano et al. 1999, Romano and Chan 2000), the
discharge-abstract based report cards states produced are unlikely to have had
noticeable eﬀects on patient and provider behavior during our study period.5
4See Iezzoni (1994, 1997a) and Richards (1994) for a discussion of some of these initiatives.
Mennemeyer, Morrisey, and Howard (1997) contains a detailed discussion of HCFA￿s reporting
eﬀorts.
5We check this modeling assumption below by exploring how treatment in states with
discharge-abstract based reporting diﬀered from treatment in New York and Pennsylvania
4For these reasons, our principal analysis treats NY and PA as the two ￿treat-
ment￿ states. Beginning in December of 1990, the NY Department of Health
released publicly hospital-speci￿c data on raw and risk-adjusted mortality of
patients receiving CABG surgery in the previous year. Beginning in 1992, NY
also released surgeon-speci￿c mortality (Chassin, Hannan, and DeBuono 1996).
Beginning in November of 1992, the PA Health Care Cost Containment Council
published hospital- and surgeon-speci￿c data on risk-adjusted CABG mortality
(PA Health Care Cost Containment Council 1998). This would suggest that
report cards could have begun to aﬀect decision-making in NY in 1991 and in
PA in 1993, though an alternative hypothesis is that a 1993 eﬀe c t i v ed a t ei sa l s o
appropriate for NY because the NY report card did not list individual surgeon
information until then.
Previous research. The existing empirical literature provides mixed evidence
on the consequences of report cards. One arm of the literature uses surveys of
patients and clinicians to assess the consequences of report cards. Although
some surveys suggest that report cards have little eﬀect on decision-making
(e.g., Schneider and Epstein 1998; see Marshall et al. 2000 for an excellent
catalogue and description of this work), other surveys reach the opposite con-
clusion. For example, in one survey, 63 percent of cardiac surgeons reported
that, as a consequence of the report cards￿ introduction, they only accepted
healthier candidates for CABG surgery . Cardiologists con￿rmed this, with 59
percent reporting that report cards made it more diﬃcult to place severely ill
candidates for CABG (Schneider and Epstein 1996).
Another arm of the literature uses analysis of clinical and administrative
data, almost entirely from NY￿s report card, to reach a very diﬀerent conclusion:
it ￿nds that report cards led to dramatic improvements in the quality of care
(Hannan et al. 1994; Peterson et al. 1998). Several researchers document the
mechanism through which this may have occurred, including inducing poorly-
rated hospitals to change patterns of care (Dziuban et al. 1994) and enabling
highly-rated physicians and hospitals to increase their market shares (Mukamel
and Mushlin, 1998).
The optimistic ￿ndings of these NY studies must be tempered by the po-
tential presence of incidence eﬀects due to provider selection, an issue that
studies such as Green and Wintfeld (1995), Schneider and Epstein (1996), Lev-
entis (1997), and Hofer et al. (1999) suggest may be of more than academic
concern. If providers perform CABG on disproportionately fewer sick patients
a n di fs i c k e rp a t i e n t sb e n e ￿t more from CABG, then the mortality rate among
patients who would have received CABG in the absence of report cards can in-
crease, even as the observed CABG mortality rate falls. The failure of previous
studies to consider the entire population at risk for CABG, rather than only
those who receive it, is a potentially severe limitation. Furthermore, none of
these studies assess the impact of report cards on the resources used to treat
CABG patients. Even if report cards reduce mortality, they may not be socially
constructive if they do so at great ￿nancial cost.
a n df r o mt h a ti no t h e rs t a t e s .
53 Empirical Models
We examine the eﬀects of the mandatory CABG surgery report card laws
adopted by NY and PA in the early 1990s. To identify matching, incidence,
and quantity eﬀects, we study cohorts of AMI patients and cohorts of patients
receiving CABG who may or may not have had AMI. We make two key assump-
tions. First, we assume that CABG report cards do not aﬀect the composition
of the population hospitalized with AMI, especially in the short run. The reason
is that AMI is a medical emergency that, unless immediately fatal, generally
results in hospitalization, almost always in the hospital at which the patient
initially presented. We explore the validity of this assumption below. In con-
trast, report cards can aﬀect the population who receives CABG because it is
an elective procedure in the vast majority of cases (Weintraub et al, 1995; Ho,
1989).
Second, we assume that AMI patients are a relevant at-risk population for
CABG, and therefore likely to be aﬀected by the adoption of report cards.
CABG is an important treatment for AMI: in 1994, 16% of elderly AMI pa-
tients will get CABG (for non-elderly AMI patients, this number is 20% or
higher); AMI patients also represent a signi￿c a n tp o r t i o no fC A B Go p e r a t i o n s
(approximately 25% in the elderly in 1994). Possibly more importantly, a
provider￿s skill at CABG is likely to be correlated with her skill at other im-
portant treatments for AMI. Thus, the quality information provided by report
cards may lead sicker AMI patients to be more willing than healthier patients to
incur ￿nancial or other costs to obtain treatment from a high-quality provider.
We estimate two types of empirical models. The ￿r s tt y p et a k e st h eh o s p i t a l
as the unit of analysis and assesses the eﬀects of report cards on the incidence
of CABG and the matching of patients to hospitals. To determine the eﬀect
on incidence, we estimate the extent to which the trend over time in the mean
health status of CABG patients in NY and PA hospitals diﬀered from the trend
in hospitals in comparison states. We then compare the DD estimates with DD
estimates for all AMI patients, to investigate whether diﬀerential trends in the
health status of CABG patients merely re￿ect diﬀerential trends in the overall
population of elderly patients with cardiac illness. To determine report cards￿
eﬀect on the match of patients with hospitals, we investigate whether report
cards led to greater within-hospital homogeneity of patients in NY and PA. A
reduction in the within-hospital variation in patients￿ health status on admission
in NY and PA hospitals relative to hospitals in comparison states is consistent
with improved matching.
The second type of empirical model takes the patient as the unit of analysis
and assesses the eﬀect of report cards on both (i) the quantity and incidence
of CABG and other intensive cardiac treatments and (ii) the resource use and
health outcomes that determine the net consequences of report cards for social
welfare. In these models, report cards aﬀect the quantity of CABG surgery (or
PTCA or CATH) if they aﬀect the probability that an AMI patient receives
CABG (or PTCA or CATH). These models also provide an alternative as-
sessment of incidence eﬀects. Report cards aﬀect the incidence of CABG (or
6PTCA or CATH) if, within the population of AMI patients, report cards have
ad i ﬀerential eﬀect on the probability of CABG (or PTCA or CATH) for sick
versus healthy patients. Finally, these patient level models allow an assessment
of report cards￿ eﬀects on cost and outcomes.
3.1 Hospital Level Analysis
To test for incidence and matching eﬀects at the hospital level, we use compre-
hensive individual-level Medicare claims data (described below) to calculate the
average illness severity of patients that are admitted to each hospital for CABG
surgery. To test for incidence eﬀects, we estimate regressions of the form
ln(hlst)=As + Bt + g • Zlst (1)
+p • Lst + q • Nst + elst,
where
l indexes hospitals, s indexes states, and t indexes time, t = 1987,...,1994
hlst is the mean of the illness severity before admission or treatment of hospital
l￿s elderly Medicare CABG patients
As is a vector of 50 state ￿xed eﬀects
Bt is a vector of 8 time ￿xed eﬀects
Zlst is a vector of hospital characteristics, including indicator variables for
rural location, medium (100-300 beds) and large size (>300 beds) (omitted
category is small size), two ownership categories (public and private for-
pro￿t, omitted category is private non-pro￿t), and teaching status
Lst = 1 if hospital is in NY on or after 1991,o ri nP Ao no ra f t e r1993, 0
otherwise
Nst is the number of hospitals, and its square and cube, in state s at time t6
elst is an error term.
We weight each hospital (observation) by the number of CABG patients admit-
ted to it. The coeﬃcient p is the DD estimate of the eﬀect of report cards on
the severity of patients who receive CABG. If p<0, then report cards have
caused a shift in incidence from sicker to healthier patients.
To con￿rm that this is not an artifact of diﬀerential trends in the health or
care of those elderly cardiac patients who reside in NY and PA, we also examine
6We include the number of hospitals in the state as a coarse control for provider partic-
ipation. If report cards reduce the number of hospitals in a state, they would increase the
measured dispersion of patients￿ health histories at the remaining hospitals, even in the ab-
sence of any true eﬀect of report cards on dispersion. Our results do not change if we exclude
this variable from the analysis.
7the trends for AMI patients. Though at risk for CABG, these patients are not
subject to selection. We reestimate (1) using the mean illness severity of AMI
patients as the dependent variable and compare this DD estimate to the DD
estimate for CABG patients.
We also calculate the within-hospital coeﬃcient of variation (CV) of the
illness severity before treatment of each hospital￿s CABG and AMI patients.
Improved sorting of patients among hospitals would cause the average within-
hospital CV of severity to decline in NY and PA relative to other states (provided
the mean of severity does not increase). We therefore reestimate (1)u s i n g
the within-hospital CVs as dependent variables; an estimated p<0i st h e n
consistent with improved patient sorting.
Report-card induced matching should also lead high-quality hospitals to
treat an increasing share of more severely ill patients. Since true quality is
not observable, and indeed may not be measured accurately by a selection-
contaminated CABG report card, we cannot test this hypothesis directly. How-
ever, we can examine whether the eﬀect of report cards varies with hospital
characteristics that are likely to be correlated with true quality, such as teach-
ing status. Returning to equation (1), let hlst again be the mean of the illness
severity of hospital l￿s CABG and AMI patients and de￿ne ZTEACH
lst to be an
indicator variable denoting whether hospital l is a teaching hospital. Estimate
(1) with the interaction ZTEACH
lst * Lst included. If r>0, where r is the es-
timated coeﬃcient on the interaction, then report cards lead more severely ill
patients to be treated at teaching hospitals.
3.2 Patient Level Analysis
We also use Medicare claims data to form a cohort of individual AMI patients.
This cohort contains information on (i) illness severity in the year before treat-
ment, (ii) the overall intensity of treatment in the year after admission, (iii)
whether the individual patient received CABG surgery, PTCA, or CATH in the
year after admission for AMI, and (iv) all-cause mortality and cardiac compli-
cations such as readmission for heart failure (HF) in the year after admission.
To test for a quantity eﬀect on CABG surgery, we estimate the regression
Ckst = As + Bt + g • Zkst + p • Lst + ekst, (2)
where
k indexes patients, s indexes states, t indexes time t = 1987,...,1994
Ckst is a binary variable = 1 if patient k from state s at time t received CABG
surgery within one year of admission to the hospital for AMI
As is a vector of 50 state ￿xed eﬀects
Bt is a vector of 8 time ￿xed eﬀects
8Zkst is a vector of patient characteristics, including indicator variables for rural
residency, gender, race (black or nonblack), age (70-74, 75-79, 80-89, and
90-99, omitted group is 65-69), and interactions between gender, race and
age
Lst = 1 if patient k￿s residence is in NY on or after 1991,o ri nP Ao no ra f t e r
1993, 0 otherwise
ekst is an error term.
A positive p implies that report cards increased the probability that an AMI
patient receives CABG. We measure the quantity eﬀects of report cards on the
alternative intensive treatments PTCA and CATH by reestimating equation (2)
for these treatments instead of CABG.
Our approach to measuring the eﬀect of report cards on outcomes and costs
follows the same line. Let Okst be a binary variable equaling 1 if patient k
from state s at time t experienced an adverse health outcome (e.g., HF) and let
ykst be his total hospital expenditures in the year after admission with AMI.
Reestimate (2) with Okst substituted as the dependent variable. If p>0,then
report cards increase the incidence of that adverse outcome. Similarly, if the
model is run with ln(ykst) as the dependent variable, then p>0 implies that
report cards increase expenditures.
To assess the eﬀect of report cards on social welfare, we compare estimates
of the eﬀect of report cards on the total resources used to treat a patient with
AMI to the eﬀect of report cards on AMI patients￿ health outcomes. If report
cards uniformly increase adverse outcomes and increase costs, then we conclude
that their eﬀect on social welfare is negative. If report cards uniformly decrease
adverse outcomes and decrease costs, then we conclude that their eﬀect on social
welfare is positive. If report cards lead to greater resource use and improved
outcomes (or reduced resource use and worse outcomes), then we can calcu-
late the ￿cost eﬀectiveness￿ of report-card induced (or report-card restrained)
treatment.
Patient level analysis also permits an alternative assessment of incidence
eﬀects. To compare the eﬀects of report cards on sick versus healthy patients,
we estimate models that include a control for patients￿ illness severity before




= As + Bt + g • Zkst + p • Lst (3)
+q • wkst + r • Lst • wkst + ekst,
where wkst is a measure increasing in patient k￿s illness severity. If this model
is estimated with Ckst as the dependent variable, than an estimate of r 6=0
implies report cards altered the incidence of CABG surgery.
In order to replicate the results in the previous literature, we also use the
claims data to form a cohort of patients receiving CABG whether or not they
had AMI, and estimate equations (2) and (3).
94D a t a
We use data from two sources. First, we use comprehensive longitudinal Medi-
care claims data for the vast majority of individual elderly bene￿ciaries who
were admitted to a hospital either with a new primary diagnosis of AMI or for
CABG surgery from 1987-1994. The AMI sample is analogous to that used in
Kessler and McClellan (2000), but extended to include rural patients. Patients
with admissions for AMI in the prior year were excluded from the AMI cohort.
For each individual patient, as a measure of the patient￿s illness severity before
treatment, we calculate total inpatient hospital expenditures for the year prior
to admission. We measure the intensity of treatment that the patient receives
as total inpatient hospital expenditures in the year after admission. Measures of
hospital expenditures were obtained by adding up all inpatient reimbursements
(including copayments and deductibles not paid by Medicare) from insurance
claims for all hospitalizations in the year preceding or following each patient￿s
initial admission. We also calculate for each patient the total number of days
in the hospital in the year prior to admission as an additional measure of illness
severity.
We construct three measures of important cardiac health outcomes. Mea-
sures of the occurrence of cardiac complications were obtained by abstract-
ing data on the principal diagnosis for all subsequent admissions (not counting
transfers and readmissions within 30 days of the index admission) in the year
following the patient￿s initial admission. Cardiac complications included re-
hospitalizations within one year of the initial event with a primary diagnosis
(principal cause of hospitalization) of either subsequent AMI or heart failure
(HF). Treatment of cardiac illness is intended to prevent subsequent AMIs,
and the occurrence of HF requiring hospitalization is evidence that the damage
to the patient￿s heart from ischemic disease has had serious functional conse-
quences. Data on patient demographic characteristics were obtained from the
Health Care Financing Administration￿s HISKEW enrollment ￿les, with death
dates based on death reports validated by the Social Security Administration.
Our second principal data source is comprehensive information on U.S. hos-
pital characteristics that the American Hospital Association (AHA) collects.
The response rate of hospitals to the AHA survey is greater than 90 percent,
with response rates above 95 percent for large hospitals (>300 beds). Because
our analysis involves Medicare bene￿ciaries with serious cardiac illness, we ex-
amine only nonfederal hospitals that ever reported providing general medical or
surgical services (for example, we exclude psychiatric and rehabilitation hospi-
tals from analysis). To assess hospital size, we use total general medical/surgical
beds, including intensive care, cardiac care, and emergency beds. We classify
hospitals as teaching hospitals if they report at least 20 full-time residents.
Our hospital-level analysis matches the AHA survey with hospital-level statis-
tics calculated from the Medicare cohorts. We use patient-level illness severity
before admission or treatment as measured by total hospital expenditures and
total number of days in the hospital in the year before admission or treatment
to calculate for each hospital the within-hospital CV and mean of these two
10variables. We use the CV of patients￿ historical expenditures to measure the
dispersion of severely ill patients because the CV is invariant to proportional
shifts in the distribution of historical expenditures. However, the CV is not
invariant to constant-level shifts in the distribution. Thus, interpretation of the
estimated eﬀect of report cards on the within-hospital CV of severities as a mea-
sure of the degree of sorting of patients across hospitals depends on how report
cards shift the distribution of severities. This is likely to be more important in
the CABG cohort than in the AMI cohort, because provider selection behavior
is more likely to aﬀect the distribution of illness severities of patients receiving
CABG than it is to aﬀect the distribution of severities of AMI patients.
Appendix tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for hospitals and pa-
tients, respectively, for the full set of control variables and outcomes used in
our analysis. As reported in appendix table 1, hospitals subject to report cards
(i.e., those in New York and Pennsylvania) account for roughly 14 percent of all
hospitals. The CV of patient expenditures and patient days in the year prior to
admission is between 1.5 and 2.5, indicating that most hospitals treat patients
with heterogeneous medical histories. As reported in appendix table 2, AMI
patients averaged between $2690 (1987) and $2977 (1994) in real 1995-dollar
hospital expenditures in the year prior to admission. These expenditures, how-
ever, were concentrated in a small subset of patients. Expenditures in the pooled
1987-94 AMI population become nonzero at the 71st percentile, and reach $9135
at the 90th percentile. CABG patients were slightly sicker in terms of prior hos-
pital utilization (with historical expenditures averaging $3771-$4431), re￿ecting
the fact that they were all undergoing a procedure intended to treat serious
cardiac illness. The relative trend in the health status of CABG versus AMI
patients was strikingly diﬀerent. While prior year￿s hospital expenditures for
the AMI population was rising, prior year￿s expenditures for the CABG pop-
ulation was falling ￿ and the number of patients receiving CABG was rising
dramatically as well. Over the 1980s and 1990s, CABG surgery was diﬀusing
to an increasing number of healthier patients.
5R e s u l t s
Table 1 presents in￿ation-adjusted mean hospital expenditures in the year prior
to entry into our study cohorts of all AMI and CABG patients from 1990 (prior
to report cards) and 1994 (after report cards). Recall that mean expenditures
in the year prior to admission is an indicator of that cohort￿s health status
i.e., lower expenditures implies a healthier cohort. Table 1 previews our basic
result￿report cards led to a dramatic shift in the incidence of intensive cardiac
treatment. The data in the ￿rst three columns of Table 1 show that the
prior year￿s expenditures for AMI patients in NY and PA increased roughly 8.5
percent. Expenditures in all other states increased by 9.4 percent, and in the
neighboring states of CT, MD, and NJ, expenditures grew by 8.6 percent. These
data re￿ect a nationwide increase in treatment intensity for elderly patients with
cardiac illness. There is no evidence of a diﬀerential change across states in
11the illness severity of AMI patients, consistent with our assumption that report
cards did not aﬀect the composition of this population.
Trends in the hospitalization history of patients receiving CABG surgery
looked quite diﬀerent. Mirroring appendix table 2, the average growth in the
prior year￿s expenditures of the average CABG patient (with or without AMI)
was substantially smaller: CABG was diﬀusing to healthier patients. But
the extent to which the incidence of CABG surgery shifted toward healthier
patients diﬀered dramatically across areas. In NY and PA, the prior year￿s
hospital expenditures of CABG patients (with or without AMI) fell; in all other
states, the prior year￿s expenditures rose; in the states neighboring NY and PA,
the prior year￿s expenditures fell, but by a much smaller amount.
The adoption of report cards in NY and PA coincided with a substantial
decline in the relative illness severity of CABG versus AMI patients, as compared
to the change in illness severity of CABG versus AMI patients in a ￿control￿
group of states. This is compelling evidence that the incidence of CABG surgery
in NY and PA shifted towards healthier patients relative to incidence trends in
comparison states.
5.1 Hospital Level Analysis: Testing for Incidence and
Matching Eﬀects
Table 2 con￿rms that report cards led to a shift in the incidence of CABG
surgery towards healthier patients and provides evidence of enhanced matching
of patients to hospitals. The estimates in the table are the result of four sets of
regressions, each with a diﬀerent dependent variable. The unit of analysis for
the regressions is the hospital/year. Each table entry represents the coeﬃcient
and standard error (corrected for heteroscedasticity and within state/time cell
error correlation) on the dummy variable Lst, ￿Report Card Present in State,￿
from a diﬀerent model. All values have been multiplied by 100 to facilitate
interpretation as percentages. We report results for two diﬀerent dates for the
eﬀect dates of report cards: (i) 1991 in NY and 1993 in PA and (ii) 1993 in both
states.
The top two rows of table 2 show that report cards led to a decline in the
illness severity of patients receiving CABG surgery, but not in the illness severity
of patients with AMI. Report cards are associated with declines of 2.43 to 5.30
percent (columns one and two) in the illness severity of CABG patients from
NY and PA relative to all other states. No such eﬀect was present among AMI
patients from NY and PA (columns three and four). Indeed, the DD estimate of
report cards on AMI patients￿ health status before admission is weakly positive,
although this is only statistically signi￿cant for the earlier NY eﬀective date.
The bottom two rows of Table 2 suggest that report cards led to greater
matching of patients to hospitals on the basis of patients￿ health status on ad-
mission. Column three shows that among AMI patients, which is the cohort
that providers can not shape through selection, report cards led to more homo-
geneous cardiac patient populations within hospitals: the CV of AMI patients￿
health histories declined signi￿cantly in NY and PA versus everywhere else.
12Column one shows a diﬀerent story among CABG patients: the CV of CABG
patients￿ historical expenditures increased and the CV of CABG patients￿ days
in the hospital was roughly unchanged. These coeﬃcients, however, are not
straightforwardly interpretable as a measure of the eﬀect of report cards on
matching in the CABG cohort because (as just discussed) report cards led to
a substantial decline in the mean of the distribution of CABG patients￿ illness
severities. This by itself increases the CV. If we assume that the mean illness
severity of CABG patients in NY and PA would have been equal to that of AMI
patients but for report-card induced changes in the incidence of CABG surgery,
then the diﬀerence in trends in the CV of CABG patients￿ health histories are
also consistent with better matching. Depending on the particular model cho-
sen, the diﬀerence between the DD estimate of report cards on the mean illness
severity of CABG patients and AMI patients was 3.5 to 7 percentage points.
Subtracting this from the DD estimate of the eﬀect of report cards on the CV
of CABG patients￿ health histories (because ln CV = lnσ −ln￿) leads in every
speci￿cation to a negative net eﬀect.7
Table 3 documents the presence of another predicted consequence of report-
card induced matching: that an increased proportion of more severely ill patients
would obtain treatment at high-quality hospitals. Since true hospital quality is
very diﬃcult to observe and patient selection may contaminate report card
rankings of quality, we use teaching status as a proxy for quality. The results in
the ￿rst and second columns show that, in spite of the aggregate decline in the
illness severity of CABG patients in NY and PA, the illness severity of CABG
patients at teaching hospitals in those states remained roughly constant. The
results in the third column shows that report cards did not change the average
severity of AMI patients in the non-teaching hospitals of NY and PA. But,
according to the fourth column, after the publication of report cards began,
the average severity of these patients among NY and PA teaching hospitals
increased substantially.8
5.2 Patient Level Analysis: Testing for Quantity and In-
cidence Eﬀects
Table 4 presents our analysis of the quantity and incidence eﬀects of report cards
on three important intensive treatments received by AMI patients: CABG,
PTCA, and CATH. We report regressions horizontally in pairs for a given de-
pendent variable: the ￿rst row of a pair presents estimates from equation (2)
and the second presents estimates from equation (3). Estimated coeﬃcients for
other covariates are not reported so as to make it easier to view the main results.
7As a second, direct test of the matching hypothesis, we estimated the eﬀect of report
cards on the standard deviation of historical patient expenditures and lengths-of-stay in the
AMI population. We found that report cards statistically signi￿cantly decrease the log of the
within-hospital standard deviation of patients￿ historical length of stay, although they do not
signi￿cantly decrease the log of the within-hospital standard deviation of patients￿ historical
expenditures.
8We reestimated these models with controls for the competitiveness of hospital markets as
calculated in Kessler and McClellan (2000, 2001), which did not change the results.
13Table 4 contains three key ￿ndings. First, report cards led to an increase
in the quantity of CABG surgery, and that increase was con￿ned to healthier
patients. Second, report cards led to a decrease in PTCA, for both sick and
healthy patients. Third, report cards led to increased delays in the execution of
all three intensive treatments, signi￿cantly reducing the probability that an AMI
patient would receive CABG, PTCA, or CATH within one day of admission.
In particular, report cards increase the probability that the average AMI
patient will undergo CABG surgery within 1 year of admission for AMI by 0.60
or 0.91 percentage points, depending on the assumed eﬀective date of report
cards. These quantity eﬀects are considerable, given that the probability of
CABG within one year for an elderly AMI patient during our sample period
was 13.1 percent.9 Consistent with Table 2￿s results on incidence, the quantity
increase was entirely accounted for by surgeries on less severely ill patients￿
those who did not have a hospital admission in the year prior to their AMI.10
This increase in CABG quantity was accompanied by increased time from AMI
to CABG: at least for healthier patients, the DD estimate of the eﬀect of report
cards on the one-day CABG rate was negative and strongly signi￿cant.
Report cards also led to substantial reductions in the quantity of other in-
tensive cardiac treatments, for both relatively healthy and sick patients. The
use of PTCA, an alternative revascularization procedure, fell dramatically in
NY and PA relative to other states. The one-year angioplasty rate for all AMI
patients fell signi￿cantly: depending on speci￿cation, by 1.69 or 1.22 percent-
age points, on a base of 12.43 percentage points. For sick patients, the one-year
angioplasty rate fell signi￿cantly as well: depending on speci￿cation, by 1.50 or
1.72 percentage points.11 Essentially identical results obtain for the thirty-day
and one-day PTCA rates. Although report cards did not aﬀect the one-year
CATH rate, they led, for both sick and healthy patients, to statistically signi￿-
cant declines in the one-day CATH rate, a measure of the rate at which patients
are on a rapid track for subsequent intensive therapeutic treatment.12
Unlike for CABG, we found no strong pattern of how report cards changed
the incidence of PTCA and CATH. Except for the one-day rates, the eﬀect of
report cards on the quantities of PTCA and CATH was roughly similar for sick
versus healthy patients. For both PTCA and CATH, there is some indication
9The proportion of AMI patients that had been hospitalized in the year prior to admission
is 0.292. The left-hand column of table 4 reports that (i) 14.76% of AMI patients who had
not been hospitalized the previous year received CABG within one year of admission and (ii)
9.10% of AMI patients who had been hospitalized the previous year received CABG within
one year of admission. Therefore the base rate is 0.708 * 14.76 + 0.292 * 9.10 = 13.1%.
10The eﬀect of report cards on more severely ill patients￿ probability of CABG surgery is
the approximately zero sum of the report cards￿ direct eﬀect and the interaction eﬀect prior
year admission.
11This is the sum of column one and column two￿s coeﬃcients: -1.50 = -1.73 + .20; -1.72 =
-.96 - .76. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors for sick patients corrected for within
state/time cell correlation (not reported in the table) are 0.49 and 0.41, for the results in the
left and right panels of the table, respectively.
12Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors for sick patients one-day catheterization rate
corrected for within state/time cell correlation not reported in the table are 0.70 and 0.63, for
the results in the left and right panels of the table, respectively.
14that the decline in their one-day rates was larger for healthy patients than sick
patients.
5.3 Patient Level Analysis: Testing for Outcomes and
Welfare Eﬀects
Table 5 presents estimates of the eﬀects of report cards on hospital expendi-
tures, readmission with cardiac complications, and mortality in the year after
initial admission. The ￿rst row shows that the shifts in treatment behavior
documented in table 4 led to higher levels of hospital expenditures for the aver-
age AMI patient. This is understandable, considering that the average patient
is more likely to undergo costly CABG surgery. Surprisingly, however, report
cards also led to increased expenditures for the most severely ill patients (sec-
ond row), despite the fact that they were no more likely to receive CABG and
were less likely to receive PTCA. The bottom six rows of table 5 present esti-
mates of the eﬀects of report cards on patient health outcomes. They show that
report cards increased signi￿cantly the average rate of readmission with heart
failure by approximately 0.5 percentage points. They also provide statistically
marginal evidence that the average mortality rate in NY and PA increased by
0.45 percentage points on a base of 33 percent.
Much more striking, however, is the diﬀerential eﬀect of report cards on
healthy vs. sick AMI patients. In spite of report-card induced additional
CABG surgeries, less ill AMI patients experienced no statistically signi￿cant
health bene￿ts. In contrast, among AMI patients with a prior year￿s inpatient
admission, report cards led to statistically signi￿cant, quantitatively substantial
increases in adverse outcomes. Relatively sicker patients experienced higher
rates of readmission with heart failure (approximately 2.3 percentage points
greater, on a base heart-failure readmission rate of 9.4 percent) and higher
rates of recurrent AMI (approximately 0.5 percentage points greater, on a base
of 5.5 percent). This helps explain the expenditure increase reported above.
Finally, in one speci￿cation, sicker patients experienced a 0.82 percentage point
statistically signi￿cantly higher mortality rate in the report card states; in the
other speci￿cation, this eﬀect is not signi￿cant.13
Taken together, our results show that report cards led to increased expendi-
tures for both healthy and sick patients, no health bene￿ts for healthy patients,
and adverse health consequences for sicker patients. Thus we conclude that
report cards reduced our measure of welfare over the time period of our study.
5.4 Validity Checks
Table 6 presents estimates based on alternative models of the eﬀects of report
cards on key treatment decisions, expenditures, and health outcomes. The left
panel of Table 6 reports the estimated eﬀects of report cards using only NJ,
13The reported estimate equals the sum of the main eﬀect (0.13) and the interacted eﬀect
(0.69).
15CT, and MD (instead of all other states) as the ￿control￿ group. Although
the statistical signi￿c a n c eo fs o m eo ft h ee ﬀects declines, the basic ￿ndings
remain intact. Report cards led to a shift in the incidence of CABG from
relatively sick to healthy patients. Indeed, using the alternative control group,
the quantity of CABG surgeries received by healthier patients increased by a
signi￿cant 0.98 percentage points while the quantity received by sick patients
declined by a signi￿cant 0.96 percentage points as a result of the introduction of
report cards.14 The one-year PTCA and one-day CATH rates for sick patients
also declined signi￿cantly, by 2.00 and 2.09 percentage points, respectively.15
Although the expenditure consequences of report cards are smaller in magnitude
and insigni￿cant in this alternative model, the adverse outcome consequences
for sick patients remain signi￿cant and large.
The right panel of table 6 reports the estimated DD eﬀects of report cards
in models that include a separate linear time trend (1987=0) for NY and PA as
well as the full set of state- and time-￿xed eﬀects that are present in all the other
models. Its purpose is to determine whether the estimates from Tables 4 and 5
are due to an underlying diﬀerential trend in treatment of cardiac patients in
report card versus all other states. Although including controls for a preexisting
trend for report card states absorbs the diﬀerential trends in treatments in
report card states versus other areas, it does not absorb the diﬀerential trend in
either expenditures or health outcomes. These slightly weaker results are not
surprising given the correlation between the time trend and the indicator for
the presence of report cards in NY and PA.
We also reestimated, but do not report results from, equations (2) and (3)
including additional controls for the discharge-abstract based report cards in
California (eﬀective 1994) and Wisconsin (eﬀective 1991). As discussed above,
our principal analysis does not assess the eﬀect of the state discharge-abstract
based report cards because it is unlikely that they would have had important
eﬀects on treatment decision-making during our study period: HCFA discharge-
abstract based report cards were present in every state from the start of our
study period through mid-1992. The CA and WI report cards diﬀered from
the NY and PA report cards in that they reported mortality by illness, not by
operative procedure. The estimated DD eﬀects of the NY/PA report cards in a
model with additional controls for CA/WI report cards are virtually unchanged
from the estimates in Table 4. In addition, we did not ￿nd robust evidence of
incidence or quantity eﬀects from CA/WI report cards, although AMI patients
in CA and WI showed a statistically signi￿cant 0.6 percentage point decline
in heart failure rates after versus before report cards, relative to that in other
non-report card states over the same period.
In other results not included in the tables, we explored the validity of the
assumption of exogeneity of the AMI cohort to states￿ adoption of report cards,
i.e., whether report cards aﬀected the selection of patients with AMI across
14Calculated as the sum of the column one and three coeﬃcients: 0.96 = .98 - 1.94. Its
standard error, which is not reported in the table, is 0.47.
15The standard errors for these two sums, which are not reported in the table, are 0.58 and
0.93 respectively.
16states and over time. First, we investigated whether trends in AMI incidence
among individuals 65 and over diﬀered in NY and PA in order to provide a rough
check that report cards did not aﬀect selection into the AMI cohort. The point
estimate of the eﬀect of report cards on AMI incidence was minuscule (between
two and three orders of magnitude smaller than the average AMI incidence in
this period) and insigni￿cant. Second, we investigated whether the estimated
eﬀects in tables 2 and 3 are due to a diﬀerential decline in the state-level CV of
AMI patients￿ illness severities in NY and PA. Unreported DD estimates of the
eﬀect of report cards on ln(state/year average CVs of year-prior expenditures)
are very small and insigni￿cant.
Table 7 is similar to table 5, but reports estimates of equations (2) and (3) for
the population of CABG patients rather than the population of AMI patients. It
shows that applying the methods of the previous literature to our population of
elderly CABG patients approximately replicates the ￿ndings of that literature.
The overall health status of CABG patients appears to improve as a result
of report cards, with signi￿cantly lower rates of AMI and mortality. Our DD
estimate of the eﬀect of report cards on 1-year mortality of about 1 percentage
point is similar to the DD estimate of the eﬀect of NY￿s report cards on 30-
day mortality of 0.7 percentage points that Peterson et al. (1998) presented.
Table 7 further shows that there appear to be no consistent adverse diﬀerential
eﬀects of report cards by illness severity. While this is consistent with the
￿ndings in Peterson et al. (1998) and Hannan et al (1994), we oﬀer a diﬀerent
explanation: observed mortality declined as a result of a shift in incidence
of CABG surgeries toward healthier patients, not because CABG report cards
improved the outcomes of care for individuals with heart disease.
6 Conclusion
Is the publication of information on health outcomes of physicians and hospitals
constructive or harmful? In markets for health care, which exhibit important
asymmetries of information and substantial heterogeneity of providers, patient-
background adjusted hospital mortality rates would appear to enable patients
to make better-informed hospital choices and to give providers the incentive to
make appropriate investments in delivering quality care. On the other hand,
mandatory reporting mechanisms inevitably give providers the incentive to de-
cline to treat more diﬃcult and complicated patients. Doctors and hospitals
likely have more detailed information about patients￿ health than can the de-
veloper of a report card, allowing them to choose to treat unobservably (to the
analyst) healthier patients. And even if they do not, providers￿ risk aversion
and low-quality providers￿ desire to pool with their high-quality counterparts
may lead them to engage in selection behavior. For these reasons, the net
consequences of report cards for patient and social welfare are theoretically
indeterminate. Report cards may be either welfare reducing or enhancing, de-
pending on the extent of provider selection and the appropriateness of treatment
decisions in the absence of report cards.
17We report three key ￿ndings. First, the NY and PA CABG surgery report
cards led to substantial selection by providers. Report cards led to a decline in
the illness severity of patients receiving CABG in NY and PA relative to patients
in states without report cards, as measured by hospital utilization in the year
prior to admission for surgery. In all speci￿cations, the shift in the incidence
of CABG from sick to healthy took the form of an increase in the quantity
of CABG surgery performed on healthier patients; in speci￿cations using the
neighboring states of NJ, CT, and MD as the control group, the increase in the
quantity of CABG for the healthy was accompanied by a signi￿cant decrease in
the quantity of CABG for the sick. In addition, report cards led to substantial
declines in other intensive cardiac procedures for both relatively healthy and
sick AMI patients.
Second, report cards led to increased sorting of patients to providers on the
basis of the severity of their illness. In particular, hospitals in New York and
Pennsylvania experienced relative declines in the within-hospital heterogeneity
of their AMI patient populations, with those two states￿ teaching hospitals pick-
ing up an increasing share of patients with more severe illness. The fact that
report cards led to increased delays for both healthy and sick patients in the
execution of all three intensive treatments supports our ￿ndings of increased
selection and increased sorting, because the processes of selection and sorting
are likely to take time.
Third, on net, the New York and Pennsylvania report cards reduced our
measure of welfare, particularly for patients with more severe forms of cardiac
illness. Report cards led to higher levels of Medicare hospital expenditures (al-
though this ￿nding was not statistically signi￿cant in speci￿cations using NJ,
CT, and MD as a control group) and greater rates of adverse health outcomes.
Hospital expenditures post-treatment increased not only for healthier AMI pa-
tients, but also for sicker AMI patients. Even as the additional CABG surgeries
the healthier patients received failed to lead to substantial health bene￿ts, more
severely ill AMI patients experienced dramatically worsened health outcomes.
Among more severely ill patients, report cards led to substantial increases in the
rate of heart failure and recurrent AMI, and, in some speci￿cations, to greater
mortality. The magnitude of the increase in the rate of adverse health outcomes
among sick patients is large but plausible, given that it is roughly proportional
t ot h em a g n i t u d eo ft h et o t a ld e c r e a s ei nt h eu s eo ft h ei n t e n s i v ec a r d i a ct r e a t -
ments that we observe, and that it was likely accompanied by other changes in
medical practice that we do not observe.
How might we explain these seemingly disparate empirical ￿ndings? For
healthier patients, doctors and hospitals substituted CABG for PTCA. The
shift to CABG from PTCA increased Medicare expenditures, but failed to pro-
vide any measurable health bene￿ts. For sicker patients, doctors and hospitals
avoided performing both CABG and PTCA, and took longer to deliver the
intensive cardiac treatments they ultimately administered.16 In response to
16Although we did not ￿nd statistically signi￿cant decreases in all speci￿cations in the
quantity of CABG for AMI patients with a prior year hospital admission, we did ￿nd (in
18report cards, hospitals implemented a broad range of changes in marketing,
governance, and patient care (Bentley and Nash 1998) that may well have led
to greater caution in the utilization of all invasive procedures in sick patients.
On net, these changes were particularly harmful. The less eﬀective medical
therapies that were substituted for CABG and PTCA, combined with delays in
treatment, led sicker patients to have substantially higher frequencies of heart
failure and repeated AMIs and ultimately higher total costs of care.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting our results too negatively. First,
we only measure short run responses, and long run bene￿ts to quality reporting
may be positive and large (e.g., Dranove and Satterthwaite 1992). Our analysis
is short run because the data we analyze is, at most, for only the ￿rst four years
of the Pennsylvania and New York report card programs. This period is short
enough that the population and skill distribution of providers likely remained
largely ￿xed. In the longer run, however, some surgeons and hospitals may take
self-selection to the extreme of exiting the market for CABG procedures while
others invest heavily to raise their skills to a higher level.
Second, our results do not imply that report cards are harmful in general.
Indeed, the fact that there is evidence of sorting in the AMI population (against
which providers cannot easily select) suggests that report cards could be con-
structive if designed in a way to minimize the incentives and opportunities for
provider selection. One potential problem with the New York and Pennsylvania
report cards we analyze is that they require reporting on all patients receiv-
ing an elective operative procedure￿not on a population of patients who suﬀer
from an illness. Future empirical work should analyze recent state initiatives
that use detailed clinical data to report on populations of patients with speci￿c
illnesses, in order to investigate if such design changes can address the short-
comings of procedure-based report cards. For example, if the quality of care
for AMI patients is correlated with the quality of care for CABG and other
types of cardiac patients, then report cards on AMI care may also be helpful
for identifying high-quality CABG providers. Future work should also measure
if report cards in the long run cause providers to take steps to improve quality,
a behavioral response that may dominate the short-run harm that the selec-
tion response caused during the period we examine here. Finally, report cards
and the incentives they create are not unique to health care. Report cards on
the performance of schools raise the same issues and therefore also need careful
empirical evaluation.
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Table 1: Mean Expenditures in Year Prior to Admission for AMI or for CABG Surgery,
Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries, 1990 and 1994
Dependent
Variable
All AMI patients All patients receiving
CABG within 1 year of
admission
AMI patients receiving








NY and PA $3110  $3373 0.0846 $4850 $4511 -0.0699 $1867 $1702 -0.0883
All other states 2660 2910 0.0940 3657 3660 0.0008 1537 1585 0.0312
CT, MD, NJ only 3055 3318 0.0861 5015 4934 -0.0162 1911 1859 -0.0272
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Table 2: Effects of Report Cards on the Within-Hospital Coefficient of Variation (CV) and Mean of
Patients’ Health Status Before Treatment, Medicare Beneficiaries with AMI and Medicare Beneficiaries
Receiving CABG, 1987-94
Beneficiaries receiving CABG Beneficiaries with AMI
Dependent Variable Assumes report
cards effective












1993 in NY and
PA
1n (Mean of patients’ total










1n (Mean of patients’ total










1n (CV of patients’ total










1n (CV of patients’ total days










Notes: Each table entry represents a separate model.  Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for
within state/time cell correlation in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to facilitate
interpretation.  Each observation weighted by the number of patients admitted to the hospital in the cohort in
question.  *-significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.  **-significantly different from zero at the 5
percent level.  Sample sizes: for AMI patients, CV of expenditures = 37,672; CV of LOS = 37,681; mean
expenditures = 38,066; mean of LOS = 38,084.  Regressions also include controls for number of hospitals in state
of residence.25
Table 3:  Effects of Report Cards for Teaching and All Other Hospitals
on the Mean of Patients’ Health Status Before Treatment,
Medicare Beneficiaries with AMI and Medicare Beneficiaries Receiving CABG, 1987-94
Beneficiaries receiving CABG Beneficiaries with AMI
Dependent Variable Report cards
effective 1991 in













NY and 1993 in
PA) * teaching
hospital
1n (Mean of patients’ total










1n (Mean of patients’ total










Notes: Each table entry represents a separate model.  Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for
within state/time cell correlation in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to facilitate
interpretation.  Each observation weighted by the number of patients admitted to the hospital in the cohort in
question.  *-significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.  **-significantly different from zero at the 5
percent level.  Sample size: for CV of expenditures = 37,672; for CV of LOS = 37,681; for mean expenditures =
38,066; for mean of LOS = 38,084.  Regressions also include controls for number of hospitals in state of residence.26
Table 4: Effects of Report Cards on CABG, PTCA, and Catheterization Rates
Medicare Beneficiaries with AMI, 1987-94
Dependent
Variable
[mean for individuals 
without and with a
prior year hospital
admission]
Assumes report cards effective 1991 in NY
and 1993 in PA
























































































































































































Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for within state/time cell correlation in parentheses.
Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. For expenditures models N =
1,768,585; for all other models N = 1,770,452.27
Table 5: Effects of Report Cards on Hospital Expenditures and Health Outcomes
Medicare Beneficiaries with AMI, 1987-94
Dependent
Variable
Assumes report cards effective 1991 in NY
and 1993 in PA

































































































Notes: Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for within state/time cell correlation in parentheses.
Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. For expenditures models N =
1,768,585; for all other models N = 1,770,452.28
Table 6:  Alternative Models of Effects of Report Cards on CABG Surgery Rates, 
Hospital Expenditures, and Health Outcomes of Individual Medicare Beneficiaries with AMI, 1987-94
Dependent
Variable
Hospitals and patients from NY, PA, CT,
MD, NJ only














































































































(0.04)   
0.55**
(0.18)   
Readmission with HF
w/in 1yr of adm
(1=yes)
0.41**






























(0.09)   
-0.02
(0.47)
Notes: Models assume report cards effective 1991 in NY and 1993 in PA. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors corrected for within state/time cell correlation in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by
100 to facilitate interpretation. For expenditures models in left panel N = 366,823; for all other models in left panel
N = 367,421. For expenditures models in right panel N = 1,768,585; for all other models in right panel N =
1,770,452.29
Table 7: Effects of Report Cards on Total Hospital Expenditures and Health Outcomes of
Individual Medicare Beneficiaries Receiving CABG Surgery, 1987-94
Dependent
Variable
Assumes report cards effective 1991 in NY
and 1993 in PA























expends in year after
admission)
8.28**
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0.86**



















Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Hospitals
Weighted by and using health histories of
AMI patients
Weighted by and using health histories of
CABG patients
1987 1994 1987 1994
CV of patients’ total
hospital expenditures









CV of patients’ total












180.3 157.7 31.58 36.52
Hospital size medium
(1=yes)
49.7% 51.9% 35.8% 46.5%
Hospital size large 25.3% 20.9% 63.8% 51.0%
Teaching hospital 19.1% 20.5% 46.2% 44.1%
Public ownership 15.7% 13.3% 10.1% 8.7%
For-profit ownership 10.4% 10.1% 7.5% 8.4%
Rural location 26.4% 24.5% 2.7% 3.8%





739 (714 with CV) 936 (922 with CV)
Notes: Hospital expenditures in 1995 dollars.31
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries with AMI and 
Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries Receiving CABG Surgery
With AMI Receiving CABG surgery












Total days in hospital





















CABG w/in 1 year of
admission (1=yes)
9.2% 16.2% 100% 100%
Readmission w/AMI
w/in 1yr of adm
5.8% 5.5% 1.1% 1.2%
Readmission with
HF w/in 1yr of adm
9.0% 9.4% 6.1% 6.6%
Mortality w/in 1year
of admission
40.2% 32.9% 12.2% 10.7%
Age 76.0 76.4% 71.39 72.54
Gender (1=female) 49.8% 48.7% 34.2% 34.7%
Race (1=black) 5.5% 5.9% 2.4% 3.4%
Rural residence 30.0% 30.9% 28.1% 29.0%
Sample size 218,641 229,215 88,457 146,986
Notes: Hospital expenditures in 1995 dollars. For full sample 1987-1994, sample size is 1,770,452 for AMI patients
and 967,882 for CABG patients.